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The Courts and Legislature Begin to
Adopt ADR Methods to Deal With
Growing Number of Employment
Discrimination Claims
BY CHERYL BLACKWELL BRYSON, ESQ.
ANURAG GULATI, ESQ.*

INTRODUCTION

Congress has to be honest with itself. It cannot continue to
pass new anti-discrimination statutes, to underfund the enforcement agencies, and then ignore the burden it has put on
the Federal court docket.'
These statements were recently made by Representative Steve Gunderson (Republican from Wisconsin) as he introduced a new bill to
alleviate problems associated with the rise in employment discrimination claims. 2 Representative Gunderson's statements reflect the
sentiment of a large number of commentators, litigants and others

concerned with the problem of overburdened courts.' This trend of
increased federal court litigation is particularly marked in the employ-

ment discrimination area.4

Cheryl Blackwell Bryson is an attorney in the Chicago office of Rivkin,
Radler & Kremer, specializing in labor and employment law. Anurag Gulati is an
associate practicing with Ms. Bryson.
1. 138 CONG. REc. E3207 (1992) (statement of Rep. Gunderson).
2. The bill, entitled the Civil Rights Dispute Resolution Act of 1992, was
introduced on October 5, 1992. See infra part V.B for a detailed discussion of the
bill.
3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
(1985) (discussing the remarkable increase in federal court filings since 1960 and ways
to alleviate the problems associated with the rise in the caseload); Warren E. Burger,
Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, 40 ARB. J. 4 (Dec. 1985) (recommending the
use of arbitration to alleviate the problems of rising federal docket).
4. See John J. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991).
*
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Increasingly, Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") 5 is being
viewed as a way to deal with employment discrimination claims. 6 This
article will focus on the Supreme Court and the legislature's growing
acceptance of ADR and the manner in which two forms of ADR,
arbitration and mediation, can be used in the employment discrimination area.
Part I of this article discusses problems posed by increased
caseloads and general dissatisfaction with litigation as a means of
resolving disputes. ADR as a possible solution to the increased
caseload problem is examined. Two methods of ADR, mediation and
arbitration, are reviewed, and the advantages and perceived disadvantages of ADR in general are considered. The historical use of arbitration to resolve disputes under collective bargaining agreements and
whether that can serve as a model for arbitration of individual
employment discrimination claims, will be explored. In part II, the
Supreme Court's growing endorsement of binding arbitration of
statutory claims, including employment discrimination claims, is outlined. In part III, questions remaining unanswered concerning the
judicial enforcement of agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination cases are discussed. Finally, part IV considers action taken by
the federal government to promote the use of ADR in employment
discrimination disputes and proposes that a more active stance be
taken by the government.
I.
A.

ADR

AS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF INCREASED LITIGATION

THE PROBLEM

Since the 1960s, the rate of civil litigation in the United States'
federal courts has increased at a tremendous rate. To elucidate, the
5. ADR refers to a variety of dispute resolution methods including arbitration,
mediation, mini-trials, and med-arb. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 12-13 (1985).

6. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panaceaor Anathema?,

99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 680 (1986) (believes many employment discrimination claims
can be resolved through the use of ADR); Peter A. Prosper & Joel M. Douglas, The
Arbitration of Human Rights Complaints: The New York Experience, 47 ARB. J. 26
(Dec. 1992) (adopting a program of voluntary arbitration in an attempt to reduce
backlog of claims); Mark R. Sherman, Streamlined Mediation: Alternative to Litigating Discharge Disputes, 46 ARB. J. 31 (Mar. 1991) (describing a pilot program to

test the use of pre-suit mediation to resolve discharge disputes); Leslie M. Gillin,
Note, A Test of Arbitrability: Does Arbitration Provide Adequate Protection for
Aged Employees?, 35 VILL. LAW. REV. 389 (1990) (advocating enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims arising in employment contracts).
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overall federal caseload for the district courts increase 250% between
1960-1983, compared with a 30% increase over the preceding quarter
century.7 The percentage rise in the general docket, however, is
dwarfed when compared with the percentage rise of employment
discrimination. Employment discrimination filings increased 216606
from 1970 to 1989 while general filings increased 12506 over the same
period.' The recent enactments of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") will surely lead to further
increases in the number of employment discrimination cases.
This increase is likely because the ADA expanded the number of
workers protected by the employment discrimination laws. The enactments of the ADEA and the 1972 amendments to title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which similarly expanded the number of
workers protected by the employment discrimination laws, resulted in
a significant increase in employment discrimination claims. 9
This litigation explosion has resulted in unprecedented problems
for the courts and litigants alike. The most obvious are increased
delay and expense, problems confronted by both the courts and
litigants. As courts become more burdened, they are unable to resolve
cases as quickly. Because courts are required to try criminal cases
expeditiously, the civil cases languish.
The other problem associated with this increased workload is that
judges have less time to spend on individual cases. Judges must decide
cases based on less deliberation, 10 rely on law clerks and others to
perform traditional functions such as drafting opinions, and spend
more time supervising their burgeoning staff.'I With the judges spending less time on cases, delegating some of their duties to others and
overseeing an ever increasing bureaucracy, the quality of justice must
suffer as a result of the rising caseload.12 These problems have led to
the search for solutions.
7. The increase in the workload of the United States Court of Appeals was
even more dramatic, rising 686%o over the same period. PosNER, supra note 3, at 5977.

8. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 4.

9. Id. at 984.

10. Judge Posner indicates that both the amount of time allowed for oral
argument as well as the number of cases in which oral argument is granted has
decreased in the Court of Appeals, giving judges less time to focus on particular
cases. POSNER, supra note 3, at 119-20.
11. Id. at 102-19.
12. Id. at 129.
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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS A SOLUTION

An increasing number of commentators are advocating the use
of ADR to resolve cases and are exploring the contours of its
usefulness. 3 ADR is the broad term used to refer to all forms of
dispute resolution other than litigation. 4 Alternative forms of dispute
5
resolution have long been used to resolve conflicts. With the explosion of litigation since the6 1960s, however, renewed focus has been
placed on these methods.
Although there are several methods of ADR that are available to
help parties resolve their disputes. 7 This article will focus on two of
the most widely used - mediation and arbitration. The general use
of mediation and arbitration and their advantages and perceived
shortcomings will be outlined.
1. Mediation and Arbitration
a.

Mediation

In mediation, a third party generally knowledgeable in the area
of the dispute, assists the parties in coming to a mutually agreed upon
solution. 8 The mediator has no power to make a decision for the
parties; his role is limited to assisting the parties to reach their own
agreements. 9 The mediator must work closely with both parties in
helping them assess their positions and the areas where they are willing
to compromise. 2° He must create an environment where productive
13. See supra note 6.
14. GOLDBERG, supra note 5, at 3.
15. For a discussion of the historical development of labor arbitration, see
MAURICE S. TROTTA, ARBITRATION OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT

DISPUTES 13-21 (1974).

16. Professor Goldberg gives a short review of the renewed interest in ADR
and the possible reasons for it. GOLDBERG, supra note 5, at 3-7.
17. The various methods include arbitration, mediation, med-arb, rent-a-judge,
mini-trials, summary jury trials, and the use of ombudsmen and private fact-finders.
Professor Goldberg outlines the characteristics of various ADR methods. GOLDBERG,
supra note 5, at 5-6; see also DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON & IRVINE ADR PRACTICE
BOOK 4-8 (John H. Wilkinson ed., 1990) [hereinafter ADR PRACTICE BOOK].

18. NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN, MEDIATION LAW POLICY PRACTICE 1 (1989); ADR PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 17, at 4-5, 114.
19. ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 18, at 1.

20. The mediator's role is described as follows: "The mediator, of course, is
the turbocharger who helps organize and bring about the exchanges of information
between the parties. At some point, the mediator typically isolates the parties and
visits each separately in caucus, encouraging the parties to examine their positions
carefully, determine realistic goals, and move toward resolution." ADR PRACTICE
BOOK, supra note 17, at 115.
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negotiations and compromise can take place. Therefore, the success
of negotiations is dependent upon the trust and comfort level that the
parties have for the negotiator. 2' Mediation seems particularly effective
in situations where the parties have an ongoing relationship and, thus,
have a strong incentive to come to a mutually agreed upon solution. 22
The format of mediation proceedings tends to be informal. The
parties first jointly meet with the mediator and summarize their
positions. The mediator also listens to the testimony of any witness
and reviews documentary evidence. The mediator then caucuses with
the parties to help them analyze the factual and legal aspects of their
positions. His discussions with each party are confidential. After
meeting with each side, he facilitates settlement by attempting to
persuade the parties to consider alternatives and to communicate
offers and counteroffers. As the process ensues he continues focusing
each side on the merits of its case. The exchange of written material
tends to be limited. Mediation typically takes no longer than one to
23
three days.
b.

Arbitration
In arbitration, unlike mediation, the parties generally relinquish
power to the arbitrator to make a decision for them. 24 The parties are
each permitted an opportunity to present their cases to the neutral
arbitrator prior to the arbitrator's decision. In this way, arbitration
is similar to judicial resolution of a dispute. Parties to the arbitration
can tailor the process to serve their own needs. Therefore, it tends to
be less formal than courtroom adjudication.
The process in an arbitration is more formal than in a mediation.
A hearing is generally held at which parties may present and crossexamine witnesses and introduce exhibits and other evidence. 25 Opening and closing statements are generally made by each side. 26 The
21. "The mediator's impartiality is of paramount importance. If the mediator
is a friend of one party, the process can backfire and undermine the trust of the
other side, making the mediator's job more difficult." Id. at 120.
22. Professor Goldberg states, "[wihen an ongoing relationship is involved it
is important to have the parties work out their own solution, for such a solution is
more likely to be acceptable to them than an imposed solution and hence more longlasting." GOLDBERG, supra note 5, at 10.
23. For a general discussion of the procedures, see ADR Practice Book, supra
note 17, at 114-17; ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 18, at 7-10.
24. FANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WoRKs 2 (1985);
TROTTA, supra note 15, at 23.
25. For a description of arbitration procedures, see ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra
note 24, at 222-95; TROTTA, supra note 15, at 90-105.
26. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 24, at 267-68.
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27
parties often submit post-hearing briefs outlining their positions.
But, the arbitrator is not bound by the rules of evidence and is
generally liberal in admitting evidence. 2" The arbitrator's decision is
award should be short and concise and it is
called an award. The
29
writing.
in
generally

c.

Primary Differences

There are certain key differences between arbitration and mediation. Arbitration is most often final and binding, while mediation is
neither final nor binding. Additionally, the arbitrator decides the
matter for the parties, while a mediator merely assists the parties in
attempting to arrive at a solution. Finally, because arbitration is an
adjudicatory process, it generally takes longer and is more expensive
than mediation. These varying characteristics make mediation and
arbitration helpful in different types of circumstances.
2.

Advantages and Perceived Disadvantagesof ADR

All ADR methods share certain advantages over litigation. First,
ADR methods are generally less expensive than court proceedings
because ADR is less formal and the processes themselves takes less
time. 30 Second, ADR methods are not subject to the overburdened
court calendar, so that delays are not encountered because of the
court's schedule. 3' Third, the decision-maker chosen to aid in the
resolution of the dispute is generally an expert in the area because the2
parties can choose whomever they like to decide their dispute.1
Fourth, since arbitration, unlike the courts, is a private forum, the
3
resolution of the dispute can be kept confidential.3 Finally, because
ADR is flexible, it can be adjusted to suit the parties' needs in
34
resolving a particular dispute.
These advantages of ADR would seem to make it particularly
appropriate for dealing with the problems caused by time-consuming
and expensive litigation in the growing number of employment dis27. Id. at 273-74.
28. Id. at 296-300; TROTTA, supra note 15, at 93.
29. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 24, at 280.
30. For a discussion of the general advantages and disadvantages of ADR, see
ADR PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 17, at 11-29.
31. Id. at 12-13.
32. Id. at 14.
33. Id. at 16.
34. Id. at 15.
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crimination cases. Already, a substantial number of corporate litigants
are making use of ADR. 35 Some commentators have pointed to
shortcomings in arbitration, which they contend make it inappropriate
for handling discrimination claims. They argue that the procedures in
an arbitration are inadequate to protect litigants; that there is too
great an imbalance in bargaining positions favoring employers in
negotiating arbitration provisions; that arbitrators are not competent
to decide statutory claims; and that disputes involving statutes, designed to achieve public ends, are best decided by courts. 36 These
arguments have largely been rejected by the United States Supreme
Court, as will be discussed in part III of this article.
3.

Use of Arbitration in Settling Grievance Disputes
Arbitration in the labor area primarily has been used to resolve
grievances against employers. The agreement to arbitrate is generally
contained in a collective bargaining agreement between the union and
management. The union represents the interests of the individual
employee in the grievance process. The grievance process consists of
a series of steps at each of which the company and union attempt to
settle the dispute. If these preliminary steps fail, the final step,
arbitration, is triggered to resolve the dispute. The decision of the
arbitrator is final and binding on the parties. 37
Arbitration became the preferred method of resolving labor
disputes at the time of the Second World War.3" Unfortunately, at
that time, agreements to arbitrate were not always enforced by state
courts and there was no federal policy concerning such agreements.3 9
35. Dana H. Freyer, The Integration of ADR into Corporate Law Firm
Practice, 45 ARa. J. 4 (Dec. 1990) (discussing the need for law firms to incorporate
ADR into their practice to serve the needs of clients interested in using ADR).
36. See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, Commentary on Arbitration of Employment
Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 799, 809 (1990).
37. For a detailed discussion of the grievance and arbitration process, see
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 24, at 153-211, 222-95.
38. Arbitration became the primary method of resolving grievances largely
through the efforts of the National War Labor Board. The Board was created by
President Roosevelt on January 12, 1942 and was charged with resolving labor
disputes which might disrupt the war effort. The Board engaged in a policy of
actively encouraging and, in some cases, ordering parties to include arbitration
provisions in their collective bargaining agreements. Martin H. Malin, Forward:
Labor Arbitration Thirty Years After the Steelworkers Trilogy, 66 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 551, 552-53 (1990); TROTTA, supra note 15, at 18.
39. At common law, agreements to arbitrate were not enforceable and some
state courts continued to follow that common law rule. Malin, supra note 38, at 55356.
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This changed with the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") of 1947, which declared a federal policy in
favor of using arbitration to resolve grievance disputes.4 Under
section 301(a) of the LMRA, the federal courts have jurisdiction to
41
decide disputes for violations of collective bargaining agreements.
Applying the LMRA, the United States Supreme Court provided a
broad mandate in favor of arbitration.
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 42 the Supreme Court
decided that the federal courts have the authority under section 301(a)
to create a federal common law for the enforcement of arbitration
clauses in collective bargaining agreements. The Lincoln Mills decision
was followed by a series of three cases, referred to as the Steelworkers
Trilogy.4 3 In these cases, the Supreme Court established a standard of44
judicial deference to the arbitrator's decision resolving a dispute.
The Court found that this deference was warranted because arbitration
was part of the parties' "system of industrial self-government." The
Court saw arbitration as the chosen manner for the union and
management to resolve the unforeseen problems that arise in their
and that court interference would generally
continuing relationship,
45
be unwarranted.
Under this deferential standard from the Court, arbitration under
collective bargaining agreements has flourished. Most collective bar40. "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to
be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." 29 U.S.C. §
173(d) (1988).
41. Section 301(a) states that "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees .

.

. may be brought in

any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties." 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).
42. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
43. The cases that comprise the trilogy are United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960).
44. In Enterprise Wheel, the Court stated that "[t]he refusal of courts to review
the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under
collective bargaining agreements." 363 U.S. at 596. It added that an arbitrator's
decision is valid "so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement." Id. at 597. In Warrior& Gulf Navigation, the Court found a presumption in favor of arbitration in collective bargaining agreements. 363 U.S. at 583-85.
Finally, in American Manufacturing Co., the Court stated, "[tihe function of the
court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract
interpretation to the arbitrator." 363 U.S. at 567-68.
45. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 580-82.
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gaining agreements now contain agreements to arbitrate. 46 This success
of arbitration in the collective bargaining area has fueled interest in
extending arbitration to other areas, including employment discrimination. Arbitration of employment discrimination claims would differ,
however, from arbitration of collective bargaining cases in some
important respects.
First, arbitration of collective bargaining disputes generally involves interpretation of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement,
while arbitration of employment discrimination claims involves interpretation of statutes. Additionally, in negotiating arbitration provisions under collective bargaining agreements, union and employers
have relatively equal bargaining positions, while an employer has
much greater bargaining position than an employee in negotiating an
arbitration clause in an employment contract. Finally, arbitration
under a collective bargaining agreement is part of the system of
industrial self-government, while arbitration under an employment
contract is a way of alleviating the overcrowded court docket and
expeditiously resolving a case. Because of these and other differences,
commentators have urged caution in extending arbitration from the
collective bargaining context to resolve individual employment dis47
crimination cases.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S GROWING'ENDORSEMENT OF

ARBITRATION

A. INITIAL RELUCTANCE TO ENFORCE STATUTORY CLAIMS

Even though the Supreme Court strongly endorsed arbitration
under collective bargaining agreements, the Court was initially reluc46. Professor Goldberg stated that more than 95% of all collective bargaining
agreements contain provisions for final and binding arbitration. GOLDBERG, supra
note 5, at 189.
47. Professor Estreicher argues that since the rationale for adopting arbitration
in employment discrimination cases is not the same as the rationale for arbitration
of collective bargaining agreements, the standard of judicial deference of arbitration
awards under collective bargaining agreements cannot be readily adopted to arbitration awards under individual contracts. See Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753, 757-60 (1990).
Professor Getman contends that it is the strength of unions and the collective
bargaining process that makes arbitration under collective bargaining agreements
successful. He does not believe that arbitration can be extended to other areas without
these features, based merely upon the success of the process under collective bargaining agreements. Julius G. Getman, LaborArbitration & Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE
L.J. 916, 917 (1979).
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tant to enforce agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. 48 In the
employment discrimination area this reluctance was demonstrated by
the Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., decision. 49 In Gardner-Denver,
a black employee was terminated and the union filed a grievance on
his behalf.50 The collective bargaining agreement between the union
and management provided for a multistage grievance process culminating in final and binding arbitration. The arbitration clause itself
was broad and covered all disputes between union and management
and "any trouble aris[ing] in the plant."'" The arbitrator found the
employee was terminated for cause. Then, the employee filed a title
VII claim challenging his discharge.
The Gardner-DenverCourt found that an arbitration agreement
in a collective bargaining agreement did not prevent an employee
from bringing a title VII claim after the arbitration.5 2 Among the
reasons for not enforcing the arbitration agreement, the Court found
that arbitration was poorly suited for resolving discrimination claims.
The Court stated that "[airbitral procedures, while well suited to the
resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively
inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by title
VII.-"3
The Court followed the Gardner-Denver decision with other
decisions holding binding arbitration agreements did not preclude
claims under other federal statues. In Barrentine v. Arkansas BestFreight System, Inc., employees submitted their wage claim for a final
and binding decision to a grievance committee pursuant to a clause
in their collective bargaining agreement and the committee ruled
against their claim.54 Despite the grievance committee's decision, the
Court permitted the employees to pursue their wage claim under the
48. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289-92 (1984);
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
49. 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).

50. Id. at 38-39.
51. Id. at 40-41.
52. Id. at 42.

53. Id. at 56. The Court noted among the shortcomings of arbitration is the
arbitrator's primary obligation to the terms of collective bargaining agreement rather
than the statute; the arbitrator's area of competence is the law of the shop, not
statutory law; arbitration has limited fact-finding; the record is not complete;
procedural rules and rules of evidence do not apply; and the arbitrator is not required
to give a reasons opinion. Id. at 56-58.
54. 450 U.S. at 730-31.
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Fair Labor Standards Act. Again, as in Gardner-Denver, the Court
expressed distrust of arbitrators handling statutory claims."
Similarly, in McDonald v. City of West Branch,5 6the Court failed
to give preclusive effect to an arbitration decision. In that case, a
terminated employee challenged a discharge decision through a grievance process established by a collective bargaining agreement between
his union and his employer. The grievance procedure culminated in
binding arbitration, and the employee's claim progressed through the
grievance process to arbitration. The arbitrator decided the employee's
discharge was proper. Despite the arbitrator's decision, the Court
permitted the employee to file a section 1983 claim in federal court.
Again, the court based its decision, in part, upon suspicion over an
57
arbitrator's ability to handle complex legal questions.
B.

THE COURT'S CHANGED APPROACH

The Court's attitude toward arbitration of statutory claims has
changed markedly in recent decisions. In a series of cases beginning
with the 1985 decision of Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth,5 the Court expressed a position strongly favoring enforcement
of agreements to arbitrate. In Mitsubishi Motors, the parties to a
commercial transaction signed an agreement to submit all of their
disputes with one another to final and binding arbitration. The Court
found that this agreement required the parties to submit a federal
59
antitrust claim by one of the parties against the other to arbitration.
6 ("FAA"), the Mitsubishi
Relying on the Federal Arbitration Actw
Motors Court found a federal policy in favor of arbitration. 61 The
Court stated that agreements to arbitrate a statutory claim, which are
governed by the FAA, are enforceable unless, "Congress itself has
55. The Court stated that arbitrators were ill-suited to handle complex legal
questions. It also found that arbitrators may be required to apply the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement even where it conflicted with statutory law. Id. at
743.
56. 466 U.S. at 289-92.
57. Id. at 290-93.
58. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
59. Id. at 640.
60. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988)). The FAA was enacted to reverse the hostility toward
arbitration agreements at common law. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2 (1924). The Act broadly provides for the enforcement of an arbitration agreement
contained in "[a] written provision in any maritime, transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce ....
" 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
61. 473 U.S. 625-26.
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evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue." 62 No such intent to preclude arbitration was
found in the federal antitrust laws at issue in the case. The Court also
reject the same arguments concerning the inadequacy of arbitration
that it had earlier accepted in Gardner-Denver, Barrentine, and
McDonald. The Court stated that arbitrators could handle complex
legal questions and would enforce the federal laws even where the law
conflicted with the terms of the arbitration agreement between the

parties .63

The Mitsubishi case was followed by other cases finding that
statutory claims could be arbitrated. In Shearson/American Express
v. McMahon,64 the Court held claims under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act could be subjected to final and binding arbitration.
Also, in Rodriquez de Ouijas v. Shearson/A merican Express,65 the
Court enforced an agreement to arbitrate a claim under the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1933.
In its most recent decision on the subject, Gilmer v. Interstate!
Johnson Lane Corp., 66 the Court, reasoning that there was no evidence
that Congress intended that ADEA claims be resolved only in a
judicial forum, found that a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate an
ADEA claim was enforceable. The discrimination claim was brought
by an employee of a financial services company against his former
employer. Upon being hired, the employee was required to register as
a securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange ("Exchange"). Under the terms of the registration application the employee
"agree[d] to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy arising between him and his employer" that was required to be arbitrated under
Exchange rules. One of the Exchange rules required arbitration of
"[alny controversy between a registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the employment or termi7
nation of employment of such registered representative. ' 6

62. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628. The burden of proving Congress
intended to preclude waiver if a judicial forum is on the party opposing enforcement
of the arbitration agreement. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227. The courts examine the
text, legislative history and the underlying purpose of the statute to determine
congressional intent. Id.
63. Id. at 633-34.

64. 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
65. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).

66. 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991).

67. Id. at 1651-52.
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After being terminated the employee filed a ADEA claim against
his employer. The employer sought to stay the proceeding because of
the agreement to arbitrate claims contained int he securities applica-

tion .68

Following the Mitsubishi line of cases, the Gilmer Court found
a federal policy in favor of arbitration under the FAA. The Court
also stated that the FAA applied to ADEA claims. The Court then
went on to examine the language, legislative history, and purposes of
the ADEA to determine whether Congress had demonstrated an intent
to preclude arbitration of claims. The Court found nothing that
indicated Congress only intended a judicial resolution of ADEA
claims. The court also stated that arbitration did not conflict with the
ADEA's purposes. 69 Therefore, the Court held the agreement must
be enforced under the FAA. The Court distinguished Gardner-Denver
and its progency on three principal grounds. First, those cases involved
arbitration agreements in collective bargaining agreements and an
employee's rights under a collective bargaining agreement were distinct
from his rights under a federal statute. Second, under an arbitration
conducted under a collective bargaining agreement, an individual
employee's rights may be subordinated to the interests of the union
as a whole. Third, the Court noted Gardner-Denver and the other
decision were not decided under the FAA.
In reaching its decision, the Court rejected many of the arguments
offered in Gardner-Denverand by various commentators against the
70
use of arbitration to resolve statutory claims.
The Court rejected arguments that agreements to arbitrate should
not be enforced because the employer has an unfair advantage over
the employee in bargaining for arbitration and because arbitrators
may be biased in favor of em'ployers. The Court stated that an
unequal bargaining position was generally not a reason to refuse to
enforce a contract and, under the FAA, an agreement to arbitrate is
treated like any other contract. The Court added that a party was
free to challenge the agreement to arbitrate on the same grounds that
any other contract could be challenged as unenforceable, such as
fraud and coercion. 71 Additionally, the Court refused to accept the
argument that arbitrators will be biased in favor of employers because
employers are more likely than employees to need the services of an
72
arbitrator in the future.
68. Id.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1652-56.
1656-57.
1655-56.
1654.
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Also rejected by the Court were arguments concerning the inadequacy of the arbitration procedure. First, the Court found that the
fact that discovery prior to an arbitration is more limited than
discovery in federal courts does not make arbitration an unsuitable
forum for resolving statutory claims. The Court stated that the
plaintiff in Gilmer did not show that the discovery provisions provided
under the statutory rules in that case would be inadequate to allow
him to present his claims." The Court stated that the party entering
into an agreement to arbitrate trades the procedures of federal courts
74
for the simplicity and expediency of arbitration.
Next, the Court addressed whether an arbitrator was required to
issue a written opinion. After noting that the arbitration rules at issue
provided for written opinions, 75 the Court noted that lack of written
opinions would not impede the development of the law because many
claims would still be decided by the courts where, presumably, written
opinions would be issued. 76 Additionally, settlement of claims presented many of the same problems as lack of written opinions. 77
The Court also dismissed arguments that arbitrators should not
decide statutory claims because they could not issue equitable and
class relief. The Court stated that arbitrators were not restricted from
issuing equitable relief. Additionally, the Court noted that even if
arbitrators could not issue class relief, they should not be prevented
7
from handling an individual case. 1
C.

POST-GILMER CASES

The federal appellate courts have extended the reasoning of
Gilmer to title VII cases. After Gilmer, the Supreme Court vacated
the Fifth Circuit in Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds,79 for reconsideration in light of its ruling in Gilmer, for reconsideration in light of
its ruling. Prior to remand, the Alford court had refused to order
73. Id. at 1654-55. The arbitration rules governing that dispute provided for
"document production, information requests, depositions and subpoenas." Id.
74. Id. at 1655.
75. The Court stated that the applicable arbitration rules "require that all
arbitration awards be in writing, and that the awards contain the names of the
parties, a summary of the issues in controversy, and a description of the award
issued." Id. at 1655.
76. Id. The Court also stated that the arbitration procedure in Gilmer had

provisions for a written agreement. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
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arbitration of a title VII claim. The facts of the case were similar to
Gilmer. A stockbroker was discharged from her job and sued for sex
discrimination under title VII. The employer moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the agreement to arbitrate. The arbitration agreement was contained in an application to register with a securities
exchange that the employee had completed upon being hired. It
provided for arbitration of employment disputes. After remand, the
Fifth Circuit reversed its earlier ruling, and granted a motion to
compel binding arbitration. The Alford court reasoned that the
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer and the similarity between title
VII claims and ADEA suits required that the arbitration agreement
be enforced. 8
Other circuit courts presented with similar factual situations have
likewise held that title VII claims can be arbitrated.12 These cases all
involved claims by employees in the securities industry, who alleged
discrimination in violation of title VII. The employees had completed
registration applications with broad arbitration agreements upon being
hired. 3 Following the lead of Alford, the courts in these cases enforced
the arbitration agreements based upon reasoning of the Supreme
Court's decision in Gilmer and the absence8 4of any intent by Congress
to preclude arbitration of title VII claims.
The growing endorsement of arbitration by the United States
Supreme Court and various lower courts has opened the possibility
of arbitration for employment discrimination claims under employment agreements between employers and employees. While the Court
rejected most of the policy grounds against arbitration of discrimination claims, it has not yet resolved all questions concerning arbitration of these claims between employers and employees.
III.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS CONCERNING ARBITRATION OF
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

The decisions of the Supreme Court supporting arbitration of
statutory claims leave unanswered some significant questions. The one
substantive question remaining regarding enforcement of agreements

to arbitrate discrimination claims is whether such agreements con-

80. 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
81. Id.
82. See Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (1lth Cir. 1992);
Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992); Willis v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
83. 971 F.2d at 689-99; 934 F.2d at 933-34; 948 F.2d at 306.
84. 971 F.2d at 699-700; 956 F.2d at 934-35; 948 F.2d at 312.
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tained in employment contracts fall within the coverage of the FAA.
Other questions relate to the procedures to be applied during an
arbitration, the standard of review, and the role of the EEOC.
A. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS

As stated earlier, the Court's recent endorsement of arbitration
has been grounded on the favored status that contracts to arbitrate
enjoy under the FAA. It is uncertain, however, whether employment
contracts are covered under the FAA. Gilmer skirted this question by
finding that the agreement to arbitrate in that case was not contained
in an employment agreement.85
From the plain language of the FAA it is not clear whether
employment contracts were meant to be excluded from coverage.
section 1 of the FAA provides, "nothing herein contained shall apply
to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
'86
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
The exclusion clearly applies to seamen and railroad workers, but it
is unclear what other categories of workers are covered or what is
meant by contracts of employment. The limited legislative history of
the statute does not clear up the uncertainty created by the statutory
language. There appear to be three theories concerning the meaning
of the exclusion.
The first theory is that the section 1 exclusion applies only to
workers engaged in transporting goods in interstate commerce. The
theory is based upon the fact that the two specific classes of workers
listed in the exclusion, seamen and railroad workers, are engaged in
interstate transport. Therefore, the general category of "any other
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" must also relate
to those engaged in interstate transport. This theory has found
acceptance by a number of courts, before and after Gilmer was
decided.17 The major problem with the theory is that there is scant
85. Gilmer, III S.Ct. at 1651 n.2. In Gilmer, the agreement to arbitrate was
contained in an application for registration with the New York Stock Exchange. The
employee was required to register with the New York Stock Exchange as a condition
of employment. Under the terms of the agreement, the employee was required to
arbitrate all claims with his employer. The Court found that the application for
registration was not an employment agreement. Id.
86. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
87. See, e.g., Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers, 235 F.2d. 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957);
Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972); DiCrisi v.
Lyndon Guaranty Bank, 807 F. Supp. 947, 952 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
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evidence that the exclusion was added to deal specifically with employees of the transportation industry.88 Therefore, this first theory
does not appear to be the best reading of the section 1 exclusion.
The second reading of the section 1 exclusion is that the general
category of "workers engaged in foreign and interstate commerce"
was meant to exclude all employment contracts. This theory has found
support among some courts and some of the justices of the Supreme
Court.8 9 It is also supported by the broad definition of commerce
adopted by the Court in interpreting another section of the FAA.9
And there is some limited legislative history supporting this interpretation. 9' This second reading of the exclusion, however, is also problematic. The section 1 exclusion was added in response to protests by
88. The FAA was originally proposed without the section 1 exclusion. After
the original bill was proposed, a protest against the bill was started by the president
of the International Seamen's Union and joined by American Federation of Labor.
Apparently, organized labor feared that the Act would lead to arbitration of interest
disputes and take away their right to strike. The protest resulted in the section 1
exclusion. See Estreicher, supra note 47, at 761 n.24. Therefore, while the protest
leading to the exclusion appears to have been started by a union for certain
transportation workers, it was joined by organized labor in general. The concerns
that led to the exclusion have not been peculiar to transportation workers.
89. In the dissent in Gilmer, Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall first found
that the arbitration agreement contained in the registration application contained a
contract of employment. They then went on to find that section 1 excludes all
employment agreements from the FAA. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
111 S. Ct. 1647, 1660 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); accord Scott v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 3749, 1992 WL 245506 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
14, 1992) (dictum); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311 (6th Cir.
1991) (dictum). This view is also supported by Professor Matthew W. Finkin. See
Matthew W. Finkin, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.KENT L. REv. 799, 802 (1990).
90. Section 2 of the FAA provides in relevant part: "A written provision in
any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable ......
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). The Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood

& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967), adopted a broad reading of the term
commerce for section 2 of the FAA.
91. See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1659-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The legislative
history concerning the meaning of section 1 is sparse. However, one frequently cited
quotation supporting this second reading is the statement made by the chairman of
the ABA committee which drafted the bill to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee. He
stated: "[The bill] is not intended [to] be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It
is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and
agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it." Hearing
on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923).
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organized labor against arbitration. Organized labor was concerned
about being forced to arbitrate all claims against management.9 2 Given
that section I was included for the benefit of organized labor and the
uncertain legislative history, a broad reading of the provision to
exclude all labor contracts would seem unjustified. Such a broad
reading would also seem unjustified because it would restrict an
employer's and a union's right to agree to an efficient means of
resolving their disputes.
The third reading of section 1 of the FAA is that it was meant
to exclude only collective bargaining agreements. 93 This appears to be
in accord with the reason section 1 was included - to address the
concerns of organized labor. Union leaders at the time saw the FAA
as an attempt by government to force them to give up their right to
strike in favor of compulsory arbitration of "interests disputes." They
were reluctant to give their right to strike and opposed passage of the
FAA. The section 1 exclusion appears to have been included to address
the concerns. 94 This reading would not restrict parties from selecting
arbitration as the forum for resolving their disputes. It does not
appear, however that any courts have been adopted this approach.
At the present time it is uncertain which of these three theories
will be adopted by the Supreme Court. Given the Court's current
endorsement of arbitration and its willingness to read the section 1
exclusion narrowly in Gilmer, it appears hopeful that the Justices will
adopt an approach that will favor arbitration of discrimination claims.
B.

ARBITRATION PROCEDURE

Another question not fully answered by the Supreme Court is
the extent to which arbitration procedure must parallel that offered
in a judicial forum. The Court has rejected generalized arguments
that the less formal and less extensive procedures offered in arbitration
are inadequate. 95 The Court failed to set any guidelines for the
procedures, to be adopted. We examine three areas of procedure discovery, the rules of evidence and written opinions, and make
recommendations for their use in arbitration.

92. See Estreicher, supra note 47, and discussion of Section 1 contained in
supra note 88.
93. This reading of section 1 is adopted by Professor Estreicher. See Estreicher,
supra note 47, at 762.
94. Estreicher, supra note 47, at 761 n.25.
95. See discussion supra part III.C.
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1. Discovery
The Court in Gilmer indicated that it would adopt a flexible
approach in assessing the adequacy of discovery. The court stated
that it would not overturn the discovery procedure if it provided the
claimant with a fair opportunity to present his case.9 The minimum
procedural requirements, however, are likely to vary with the circumstances of the case.
When determining what is needed to afford the claimant a fair
opportunity, the court should generally defer to the judgment of the
parties or the arbitrator as to the extent of discovery. Given the
flexibility of arbitration, the parties can set the amount of discovery
to suit their needs. Only where it appears that a party was unreasonably denied any discovery or discovery was very limited, should the
court consider ordering a new arbitration, with a greater opportunity
for discovery.
2.

Rules. of Evidence
Generally, in arbitration, the rules of evidence are not closely
followed. 97 This benefits the parties by allowing them to expedite the
proceeding and introduce evidence freely. The Gilmer court acknowledged that the rules of evidence did not apply in an arbitration and
found this a favorable aspect of arbitration in some respects because
it counterbalanced the reduced discovery available. 98 It does not
appear that there is any significant danger presented if the arbitrator
does not strictly follow the rules of evidence. There is no jury that is
in danger of being prejudiced by the introduction of evidence. Therefore, the courts should be extremely reluctant to reverse an arbitration
award because a particular rule of evidence or the rules of evidence
generally were not followed.
3.

Written Decisions by the Arbitrator
The Gilmer Court has left it somewhat unclear whether a written
opinion must be issued by the arbitrator. 99 Arbitrators generally issue
96. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. at 1647, 1655 (1991).
97. See supra part I.B.l.b.
98. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1655.
99. In Gilmer, the arbitration procedure at issue required written opinions.
However, the Court did not seem to find the prospect of no written opinions
troubling. Addressing concerns that lack of written opinions will prevent public
knowledge of the dispute, inhibit the development of the law and preclude effective
appellate review the Court stated, "judicial decisions addressing ADEA claims will
continue to be issued [even if arbitrators do not issue opinions] because it is unlikely
that all or even most ADEA claimants will be subject to arbitration agreements."
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written opinions, 00 and it would seem appropriate to require them to
do so. Without written opinions, it would be extremely difficult for
the court to review an arbitrator's decision and, as stated in the next
section, the court still retains some power for such a review.
Written opinions provide the court with some meaningful basis
to review an arbitrator's decision. The arbitrator's opinion does not
have to be long. It can merely recite some of the salient facts of the
case, the authorities relied upon by the arbitrator in reaching his
decision and a brief analysis setting forth the result. This will enable
the court to make sure that the arbitrator applied the relevant authority in the case.
4.

Role of the EEOC

An employee is generally required to file a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") prior to filing an
employment discrimination action in federal court. 0' During this
period, the EEOC is given an opportunity to become apprised of the
claim and file on behalf of the employee if it so chooses. 0 2 To
preserve the EEOC's role, Professor Estreicher suggests that arbitration should be stayed during this period provided for the EEOC to
review the claim. 03 He adds that the EEOC could then decide whether
to file an enforcement action, precluding private resolution of the
dispute. In considering whether to file a claim, the EEOC would also
assess the adequacy of the arbitration procedures.' 4
More important, the Supreme Court also envisioned a continued
role for the EEOC in cases that are arbitrated. In addressing the
concern that arbitrators could not award classwide or equitable relief
in Gilmer, the Court stated that "it should be remembered that
arbitration agreements will not preclude the EEOC from bringing
actions seeking classwide and equitable relief."'0 5 The Court did not
state, however, that the administrative review process must be completed before a matter can be arbitrated. And there does not appear
to be any reason to impose such a requirement. The administrative
review by the EEOC is merely part of the procedure the parties have
100. See supra part I.B.l.b.
101. For title VII claims the employee must wait for a right-to-sue letter before
filing suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988). For an ADEA, the
claimant must wait 60 days before filing suit. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1988).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1988).
103. Estreicher, supra note 47, at 790-91.
104. Id.
105. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1655 (1991).
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chosen to forego in favor of a private resolution of the dispute.
Estreicher's proposal can thwart the will of the parties. Despite their
agreement to a private, expedient resolution of the dispute, under his
proposal the EEOC can force a public, time-consuming and expensive
forum upon them. Under Estreicher's proposal, the EEOC would
even have the power to decide if the procedure agreed to by the
parties is adequate. Furthermore, Professor Estreicher's approach also
places additional burdens on the already overburdened EEOC because
it must closely examine the arbitration procedure prior to deciding
whether to follow an arbitration or file an enforcement action.
Because the arbitrator is in a position to take appropriate action
in a case, the EEOC has no further role. If the arbitrator cannot
afford the remedies sought by the parties, such as classwide relief,
the parties can, then, seek relief from the EEOC.
C.

STANDARD OF REVIEW BY THE FEDERAL COURTS

The Supreme Court has stated that its review of an arbitrator's
decision will be limited, but it will be "sufficient to ensure that the
arbitrator complies with the requirements of the statute.'" 06 From this
statement it is unclear whether the court will review an arbitrator's
legal judgments or merely make sure he took into consideration
relevant authority. The better approach would limit the court's review
to whether the arbitrator took into account relevant legal considerations. This approach is consistent with the "manifest disregard"
standard for review of arbitrator's decisions under the FAA. 0 7
While this standard appears to allow great deference to the
arbitrator's judgment, such deference appears justified. The parties
chose arbitration knowing its benefits and costs. An arbitration
proceeding has the benefits of speed and efficiency, although it lacks
formal court procedures and review. These benefits would be lost if
arbitration decisions were subject to lengthy delays and appeals.
Therefore, the court should not review the arbitrator's decision for
errors of law or fact as it would a lower court decision.
The court, however, should make an additional inquiry in reviewing an arbitration award. It should ensure that the arbitrator had the
power to award all the remedies that the claimant would be entitled
to under the statute. In agreeing to arbitration, an individual relinquishes the procedures of a judicial forum, not statutory substantive
106. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahnon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987).
107. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953); Seigel v. Titan Indus. Corp.,
779 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1985).
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rights and remedies. 0 8 Finally, the award would be subject to reversal
under the standards stated in sections 10 and 11 of the FAA, such as
bias by the arbitrator, fraud and corruption.,09
V.

THE LEGISLATURE BEGINS TO EXAMINE THE

ADR OPTION

Realizing that federal courts are overcrowded, the federal government is increasingly looking to ADR as an option." 0 However, in
the employment discrimination area, the federal government has
mainly restricted itself to simply encouraging the use of ADR. While
these efforts are a step in the right direction, this article advocates a
more aggressive posture by the government. The government should
facilitate the use of ADR to resolve employment discrimination claims
for parties who wish to use it.
A. CURRENT PRACTICE

The new employment discrimination statutes, both the ADA"'
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,112 encourage the use of alternative
dispute resolution practices. However, these Acts do not take any
concrete steps to provide mechanisms for the use of alternative dispute
mechanisms nor do they assure parties that use of arbitration will be
considered final and binding by the courts. To create increased use
of ADR the government should provide a mechanism to encourage

its voluntary use." 3

108. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985).
109. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (1988).
110. ADR is enjoying increasing acceptance at the federal level. Federal agencies
are required to adopt a written policy on how to implement ADR at their agency
under the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 581 (Supp.
1991). Under the Act, the Labor Department adopted a pilot program which used
mediation to resolve disputes. This program was very successful and the Department
plans to expand the program. Marshall J. Breger, LaborDept. Leads Way On ADR,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 15, 1993, at 15-16.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1990).
112. Government Employee Rights Act of 1991, 2 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. 1991).
113. Most employment discrimination claims are brought bydischarged employees. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 4, at 984. These employees have a
particular interest in pursuing ADR because they may not have the resources to
litigate and have an interest in recovering damages or being reinstated as soon as
possible.
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ENCOURAGING USE OF MEDIATION

Mediation is a procedure where the parties must have implicit
trust in the mediator. 114 Therefore, the Congress could encourage the
use of mediation by providing a statutory mechanism whereby neutral
mediators are chosen by the parties jointly. Additionally, the parties
are likely to ,feel more comfortable about its use if such a mediation
is provided for in the law rather than suggested by one of the parties.
Some parties may be unfamiliar with mediation and may be reluctant
to agree to it. If it is suggested by an opposing party, who they felt
may be suggesting it merely as a device to gain a tactical advantage.
Parties unfamiliar with mediation are less likely to feel threatened by
the idea if it is introduced by a neutral third party, like the government. A federally assisted mediation is just what was proposed by
Representative Gunderson and Senator Danforth at the end of the
102nd Congressional session." 5
The bill provides a mechanism for mediation of claims under title
VII, the ADA and section 1981. Under the bill, the claimant or
respondent can request mediation fourteen days after the claimant
receives a right-to-sue letter. The responding party can also request
mediation fourteen days after being notified that a state or federal
authority is planning to file a civil action against him. A mediator
would be provided by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
("FMCS") or the parties could agree to a mediator who would be
bound to follow the rules of the FMCS. After such a request is made,
no suit would be filed until the mediation is completed or ninety days
6
have passed."
This bill has three aspects that make it particularly appealing.
First, neither party can sue during the time the mediation is taking
place, which allows the parties to focus exclusively on mediation.
Second, as Representative Danforth stated, "[tihe most important
' 7
feature of this bill is that mediation is done by a true neutral." "
Since the mediator is either provided by the government or has to
follow procedures outlined by the government, he will not have an
appearance of bias for either side. Third, the mediation takes place
114. See supra part II.B.l.a.

115. The bill entitled the Civil Rights Dispute Resolution Act of 1992 was jointly
introduced by Representative Gunderson and Senator Danforth on October 5, 1992.
It was reintroduced on March 30, 1993 as H.R. 2016. After reintroduction it was
referred to the Judiciary Committee and a committee on labor.
116. H.R. 6197, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
117. 138 CONG. REC. S16979 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Danforth).
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at the beginning of the lawsuit before major expenses are incurred in
litigation.
This effort by Representative Gunderson is to be applauded and
supported because it aids the parties in coming to a time-efficient and
inexpensive way of resolving a dispute. The bill could also be extended
to resolving ADEA claims.
The limitation of this bill is that mediation may not be appropriate for all discrimination disputes. It must be remembered that in
mediation, the parties must agree to a solution, and this may be
difficult especially if there are strong animosities between a recently
discharged employee and employer. The parties should also be given
the opportunity for resolving a claim through arbitration, where a
neutral third party can decide the case but which is less expensive and
time-consuming than the courts. With the parties having the joint
option of arbitration and mediation, the court calendar will also be
reduced.
C.

ALLOWING USE OF ARBITRATION

We propose that the federal legislature should ensure that employment agreements to arbitrate are enforceable. The legislature
could easily accomplish this by removing or amending section 1 so
that it is clear that it does not include individual employment contracts. This would alleviate any confusion on the part of courts and
assure parties that agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination
claims will be enforced.
Although the FAA contains protections against fraud, coercion
or bias by the arbitrator, the legislature could amend the FAA to
provide additional protection for employees if it so chooses. Given
that one of the primary advantages of arbitration is its flexibility, the
procedure to be used should remain largely in the hands of the parties.
However, to deal with the problem of unequal bargaining position,
the legislature may want to include a provision requiring an employer
to give the employee the right to accept or reject an arbitration
provision in the contract, after the employee has been hired, without
it affecting the employee's job status.
By amending the FAA to explicitly require enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, the legislature would reduce uncertainty on the
part of employers and employees, encourage arbitration, reduce the
number of employment discrimination cases in federal court, and,
also, create place any protection for employees that it believes necessary.
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CONCLUSION

Due to a rise in the civil docket in federal courts and the growing
dissatisfaction with litigation, ADR is gaining acceptance as a means
of resolving such disputes. This article discussed the use of arbitration
and mediation to resolve one of fastest growing areas of the federal
docket - employment discrimination cases. Old attitudes concerning
the inadequacy of arbitration procedures and the perceived inability
of arbitrators to resolve statutory claims have largely been rejected
by the Supreme .Court. But questions do remain concerning the use
of arbitration.
Applying the Federal Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court has
endorsed arbitration as a way to resolve employment discrimination
cases. However, it has left open the question of whether employment
contracts fall within the section 1 exclusion to the FAA. While there
are various readings of section 1, the one most in accord with the
reason for the statute's enactment and with the Courts' current
endorsement of arbitration, only excludes collective bargaining agreements from the FAA. Thus, should the court decide to go this far,
section 1 can be read to endorse arbitration of employment claims
arising outside the context of collective bargaining agreements.
The Court has also left unanswered questions concerning adequate arbitration procedure, the role of the EEOC where parties have
selected arbitration, and the standard of review from an arbitrator's
decision. First, this article argues that arbitration procedure, including
the extent of discovery and the adherence to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, should largely be left to the parties to decide. Arbitration
procedure is flexible and the parties can adjust it to suit their needs
in a particular case. Second, the role of the EEOC should be limited
in cases where arbitration is chosed by the parties. The administrative
procedure provided by the EEOC is part of the procedure that has
been given up by the parties when entering into arbitration. Third,
the standard of review should be limited to primarily discovering
whether the arbitrator applied the correct standards. Given that the
parties chose the arbitrator to resolve the dispute, challenging his legal
judgment and factual findings would not be warranted.
Finally, the role of the federal government in expanding the
ability of parties to use arbitration and mediation to resolve their
dispute was examined. Representative Gunderson has offered a proposal that would encourage the use of mediation by providing a
neutral federal mediator and a procedure where parties can mediate
prior to a costly litigation. We endorse Representative Gunderson's
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efforts because they provide a neutral mediator and a government
endorsed procedure for resolving disputes. It is also recommended
that the FAA be amended to make it clear that employment agreements are not excluded from its coverage. This would allow parties
to negotiate arbitration agreements with the certainty that they would
be enforced.

